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Issue I

COURTREPORTS

resentatives, claiming that the conversion of these districts disqualified
them as organized divisions of the Red Bluff District and prevented
them from electing representatives to the board. Both sides sought
declaratory relief and, following a bench trial, the 143rd District Court
of Ward County entered judgment in favor of Red Bluff District. Ward
District 1 and Ward District 3 appealed to the Court of Appeals of
Texas, Eighth District.
In interpreting the statute de novo, the court observed that the legislature initially approved control and improvement districts for inclusions in power control districts such as Red Bluff, but later amended
the statute to omit them. Red Bluff maintained, as did the trial court,
that this change in the statute indicated an intention by the legislature
to restrict membership in power control districts to improvement districts. However, the court held that, rather than evidencing an intent
to forever restrict membership to improvement districts, the legislature
intended only to exclude the more powerful control and improvement
districts from inclusion in power control districts. Furthermore, the
trial court's restrictive approach to the statute was inconsistent with a
general legislative intent to permit conversion of one type of water district to another. As such, Ward Districts 1 and 3 could remain functional members of the Red Bluff District.
Red Bluff also claimed that Chapter 58 irrigation districts could not
elect representatives to its board because the election procedures provided for these districts would lead to voter disenfranchisement. Under Chapter 58, eligibility to vote in irrigation district elections is based
on ownership of irrigable land, excluding non-landowners. The court,
however, pointed to United States Supreme Court precedent concluding that such elections do not violate equal protection because of the
special limited purpose of water districts. The court concluded that
the issue was irrelevant here because Chapter 58 only applies to elections of the irrigation district's own board of directors and does not
apply to the election of representatives to the Board. Thus, the court
reversed the trial court in favor of the irrigation and water improvement districts.
Noah Klug

UTAH
Searle v. Milburn Irrigation Co., No. 20040406, 2005 Utah LEXIS 98
(Utah Sept. 2, 2005) (holding: (1) an applicant seeking a change in
water use need only show reason to believe approval of an application
will not result in impairment of a vested water right; (2) applicant
bears the burden of persuasion throughout the application process;
and (3) protestant may successfully oppose an application approval by
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producing direct or circumstantial evidence that undermines an applicant's showing).
Lawrence and Ann Searle ("Searles") purchased a water right in
Sanpete County, Utah. To comply with requirements necessary to obtain a building permit, the Searles filed a change application with the
State Engineer to change the point of diversion, place of use, and nature of use of the water right. Milburn Irrigation Company ("Milburn") opposed this application, claiming it would impair its prior existing rights. After an informal adjudicative hearing in which both parties presented argument and testimony, the State Engineer rejected
the Searles' application, as well as the Searles' subsequent request for
reconsideration.
The Searles filed suit in the District Court for the Sixth District
seeking judicial review of the State Engineer's decision. At trial, the
Searles offered testimony from an expert witness supporting their contention that their requested change application would not impair Milburn's water rights. Milburn, in turn, offered testimony from two expert witnesses supporting its contention that the change would impair
its rights. The district court reached the same conclusion as the State
Engineer and denied the Searles' application.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Utah, the Searles and the State
Engineer took exception to the approach adopted by the district court
in which the burden of persuasion "shifted from the applicant to the
protestant" and that the "standard of proof was by a preponderance of
the evidence." The State Engineer argued that the burden of persuasion remained on the Searles, whereas the Searles argued that the
standard of proof placed on Milburn should have been more akin to
clear and convincing evidence, rather than proof by a preponderance
of the evidence.
The court addressed three areas of concern with the approach that
the district court adopted. It analyzed whether the district court: (1)
properly invoked the preponderance of the evidence standard of
proof; (2) appropriately allocated the burden of proof; and (3) correctly concluded that a change applicant's prima facie showing that no
impairment will result from application approval could be undermined
by circumstantial evidence demonstrating the probability of impairment.
The court first provided a brief overview of the change application
process itself, as well as the procedural course followed by the district
court in the present case. The court noted that the lower court relied
on its decisions in Crafts v. Hansen and Salt Lake City v. Boundary Springs
Water Users Ass'n to justify applying a "burden shifting scheme" as well
as utilizing a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. However, the court distinguished the applicability of the language in those
cases to the case at hand, reasoning that the proper procedure to fol-
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low when considering the merits of a change application is to analyze
those cases in conjunction with the Utah Code.
In establishing the appropriate procedure for determining the
merits of a change application, the court balanced the two policy goals
of putting water to the most beneficial use possible while simultaneously guarding vested rights. The court distinguished the standard of
proof applicable to the application process from the standard applicable to a final adjudication of rights. A review of case law established
that an applicant need only show a reason to believe that a proposed
change would not impair any vested right. The court analogized the
application stage where a reason to believe is appropriate, to the preliminary phase of a criminal trial where probable cause is sufficient to
allow the case to proceed. It reasoned that allowing for a less onerous
burden at the application stage allows for the development of water
uses to the maximum extent possible.
The procedures already in place would also guard against harming
existing rights. The burden remains on the applicant to invest the resources necessary to develop the proposed change. After the change is
implemented, the applicant still bears the burden of showing that the
implemented changes do not impair other rights. If an impairment of
vested rights occurs, the burden is on the applicant to sustain the loss
for the development. This system ensures that the applicant will take
all the necessary precautions to ensure that his proposed change will
not adversely affect the rights of others.
The court reasoned that the burden of persuasion remains on the
applicant for the duration of the application process because it is the
applicant who is disturbing the existing order. It also reasoned that
circumstantial evidence can undermine an applicant's proposed
change because determinations of impairment often hinge on probabilities and not on direct observation, measurement and calculation.
The court noted there could be situations in which circumstantial evidence could successfully undermine an applicant's evidence to such an
extent that it would be unreasonable to believe that the proposed
change could be accomplished without impairing vested rights.
The court concluded that the district court applied the wrong standard of proof. The court also held that the parties improperly allocated the burdens of proof. The court remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration under the standard outlined.
Rogerj. Lucas

